Sreerama Varma Raja P C

Compatibility of doctrines of No-Self, Nirvana and Reincarnation in Buddhism

Published on June 04, 2019

Introduction

This essay examines the Buddhist doctrines of no-self, Nirvana, and reincarnation, and explores their compatibility. All three doctrines are central to the conceptual framework of Buddhism. Given that Buddhism is ancient (roughly 2500 years old), one can be certain that it has undergone several rigorous examinations in terms of reasoning and logical inconsistencies by many philosophers. The motivation for this essay is the predominance of the above-mentioned doctrines in Buddhism and their compatibility being crucial for Buddhism to appeal as a school of philosophy to the larger community of philosophers around the world. For that, it must go through conventional methods of philosophical inquiry such as logical reasoning. The central question of this essay is this: if we are to assume that the doctrine of no-self is true, which is to assume that there are no selves, then how do we make sense of one attaining Nirvana, or conversely, failing to do so and continuing on a cycle of reincarnations? Should there be a self in order to attain Nirvana or to reincarnate? If not, then who attains Nirvana or reincarnates?

The key to finding answers to these questions lies in comprehending and examining the doctrines of Nirvana and reincarnation. But initially, we will go over the doctrine of no-self exhaustively, treating it as a philosophical argument and examining its validity, since it was strongly asserted by the Buddha himself in his sermons such as in The Water-Snake Simile. The doctrine of no-self is built through two arguments: the argument of impermanence and the argument of control. To understand what the Buddha thought the self was, we will try to build a list of criteria for the self which the Buddha denied the existence of. This will render useful later when we check for the compatibility of the doctrines of no-self, Nirvana, and reincarnation and prevent us from confusing the self discussed in Buddhism with the self discussed in other schools of philosophy.

While we examine the compatibility of the Buddhist doctrine of no-self and the doctrine of reincarnation and the path to Nirvana, we must remember that many profound thinkers, the Buddha himself being one, have found a way to hold all of these doctrines simultaneously. But the drawback to that is, as we will see in the essay, that one will have to let go of reason and the conventional methods of philosophical inquiry.

We will discover that if we assume the doctrine of no-self to be true, then the combination of doctrines of no-self, Nirvana, and reincarnation will become logically incompatible. If we are to assume that the doctrine of no-self is false, then the Buddhist principles of non-attachment and universal compassion will have no solid ground to operate on, since they rely on the soundness of the no-self doctrine. We will also explore the difficulty in comprehending the doctrine of Nirvana using conventional methods of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, we will see that if the doctrines of no-self, Nirvana, and reincarnation are in fact compatible, that by itself will fail to qualify the doctrine of no-self as true.

Buddhism as a compendium of concepts is very concise and well-structured. Foundationally, there are four noble truths. They are: suffering (Dhukka), craving (Samudaya) which is what causes suffering, cessation of suffering (Nirodha), and the path towards the cessation of suffering (Marga). The Buddha tells us that the path towards the cessation of suffering is often mistaken by many when they choose hedonism, a pursuit of pleasure, or asceticism, a pursuit of pain. Avoiding these extremes, there is a middle-path. This path is called the noble eightfold path. It consists of eight components: right understanding, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. One has to follow all eight paths to successfully eradicate suffering. Out of these, the path of right understanding requires one to recognize three doctrines - the doctrines of impermanence, no-self, and suffering.

Argument of No-Self

Essentially, the Buddhist doctrine of no-self argues that it is only conventionally true but not ultimately true that we are persons. That is, we consider ourselves to be persons only because we are made up of the five aspects (skandhas): body (rupa), feelings (vedana), perceptions (samjna), volitions (samskaras), and consciousness (vijnana). And that the word ‘person’ is just a convenient designator when we say that a person is something over and above these components. In his book Buddhism of Philosophy, Mark Siderits calls it ‘mereological reductionism’ about persons, which means that the whole does not exist but only the parts. He also explains the difference between a statement being conventionally true and ultimately true. He writes, “A statement is conventionally true if and only if it is acceptable to common sense and consistently leads to successful practice. A statement is ultimately true if and only if it corresponds to the facts and neither asserts nor presupposes the existence of any conceptual fictions.”

Argument from Impermanence

The doctrine of no-self expounded through the argument from impermanence is explained in detail in Milindapanha (Questions of King Milinda). It is an account of the dialogue between a king, Milinda, and a Buddhist monk, Nagasena. Milinda is a historical figure of Greek ancestry from around 200 BCE. Even though it is not an early Buddhist work and does not record the teachings of the Buddha and his immediate disciples, it is still useful for our purposes. Since it is recognized by a number of different Abhidharma schools, its views represent a consensus among a wide variety of commentary traditions on the teachings of the Buddha. The story is about the first meeting of Milinda and Nagasena and how the conventional practice of exchanging names leads to a substantive philosophical dispute. When King Milinda and Nagasena first met, Milinda greeted Nagasena and enquired about his name. Even though Nagasena told his name, he also added that this is just a sound used for convenient designation and that there is no person as such. This startled Milinda, and he asked Nagasena who, then, is the monk who is embarking on the path to Nirvana. To this, Nagasena replied with a set of questions going through all five skandhas of himself and asking if that is Nagasena. Milinda answered negatively to all these questions. Nagasena thus established that there is no Nagasena ultimately. To this, Milinda replied with a question of whether the name Nagasena is an empty sound. But rather than confirming it, Nagasena asked the same set of questions as before but this time about Milinda’s chariot. He asked whether the parts of the chariot, like the wheels, seat, axle, pole, and so on by themselves constitute the chariot. Milinda had to answer negatively to these set of questions as well, which led up to Milinda realizing that a person’s name, Nagasena, was just a convenient designator, just like the name chariot.

For convenience, the argument in the story of Milinda and Nagasena can be formalized in the following form:

This is a valid argument since the propositions lead to the conclusion and the conclusion cannot be false if all propositions are true. It is also worth noting the relationship between the idea of impermanence from the above argument and numerical identity. The propositions of impermanence of each skandha mean that each skandha fails to remain numerically identical (even though qualitatively similar) as time passes. This is entailed in the doctrine of momentariness that at every moment, all the five skandhas arise, get destroyed, and this process is repeated by the arising of other numerically distinct skandhas in succeeding moments. This can be empirically verified by observing our mental states like thoughts, feelings, and objects of consciousness.

Argument from Control

Another formulation of the doctrine of no-self is using the argument from control. The argument from impermanence started with the use of the word “I” as the state of a person. In this argument, we consider the other meaning of the word “I,” as something that can change the state of a person or something about themselves. Mark Siderits calls this the executive function. To argue for the non-existence of this kind of self, the Buddhists use the principle of anti-reflexivity, that an entity cannot operate on itself. The example that demonstrates this principle given by the Buddhists is that of how a knife cannot cut itself. Mark Siderits writes, “if the self performed the executive function, it could perform that function on other parts of the person, but not on itself. This means that I could never find myself dissatisfied with and wanting to change myself, which in turn means that any part of me that I can find myself wanting to change could not be myself.”

This argument can be formalized in the following manner:

This argument is also valid like the previous one. It is to be noted that both these arguments use the exhaustiveness claim, that there is nothing to a person other than the five skandhas.

The Self That the Buddha Denied

From the above argument, one could deduce the nature of the self discussed to have the following criteria:

But through empirical observations, Buddhists infer that there is no such self. The word ‘I’ is just a convenient designation for the integration of the five skandhas. And when we examine these skandhas, we realize that none of them individually meet the criteria to be the self. Can there be something outside of these five skandhas which is the self? The answer to this comes from the seventh proposition of Nagasena’s argument, which is the exhaustiveness claim, that there is nothing more to a person other than the five skandhas.

Thinkers who object to this exhaustiveness claim argue that Buddhists sticking to empirical means in order to discover the self is a mistake. It is true that one cannot discover the self in the five skandhas since the self by the definition of the criteria derived from Nagasena’s argument is beyond the five skandhas. But what if we are wrong to assume that the self is an object similar in quality to the five skandhas? For example, Adi Sankara, a philosopher and theologian from around 8th century CE, who followed the school of Advaita Vedanta in Hinduism, pointed out that the self is that which does the pointing, rather than that which is pointed at, pertaining to the idea that assuming that the self is something that has similar qualities of that of the five skandhas itself is a mistake. But the Buddha defended sticking to strict empirical methods to attempt discovering the self because he argued that without the means of empirical methods, the pursuit of knowledge becomes mere speculation. Going back to the sermon of the Water-Snake Simile Discourse, the Buddha says, “O monks, when neither self nor anything pertaining to self can truly and really be found, this speculative view ‘The universe is that Atman (Soul); I shall be that after death, permanent, abiding, everlasting, unchanging and I shall exist as such for eternity’, is it not wholly and completely foolish?”

The concept of the self in the school of Advaita Vedanta follows the same criteria of impermanence and numerical identity. However, it does not have the criterion of control since it is merely an experiencer of mental states. Adi Sankara conceives the self as a universal and transcendental identity that is not connected to the physical world of appearances. Thus, the conception of the self from the school of Advaita Vedanta and the self discussed and discarded by the Buddha are not identical. This is because the nature of the self discussed in Advaita Vedanta is transcendental while the nature of the self discussed by the Buddha is experiential.

So far, by analyzing the two arguments for the doctrine of no-self—the argument from impermanence and the argument from control—we have not yet found any logical incoherence. Now we shall analyze the doctrine of Nirvana and reincarnation to check whether they are compatible with the arguments for no-self.

Nirvana and Reincarnation

In Buddhism, Nirvana is defined as the liberation from continual rebirth and suffering, which is reincarnation. This occurs when we rid ourselves of ignorance and the false belief in a self. It is important to note here that what is eliminated is the suffering that arises from ignorance, not the self itself, since there was no self to start with, only a false belief in it. It should also be clear that suffering results in the cycle of reincarnation (Samsara), and to attain Nirvana is to stop the suffering-laden cycle of births and deaths. Both doctrines are conceptually opposites of each other because Nirvana is described as the state where there are no more reincarnations, and reincarnations happen due to the absence of Nirvana.

In Sanskrit, Nirvana means to "extinguish." But one must be careful not to associate Nirvana with a nihilistic concept, as in Buddhism it is seen as a liberation from suffering and a blissful state, rather than extinction or annihilation. However, the question of the necessity of the self for whom Nirvana occurs remains.

What the Buddha said about Nirvana has been difficult to comprehend. The Buddha says, “To say that he is reborn would not fit the case… to say that he is not reborn would not fit the case… to say that he is both reborn and not reborn would not fit the case… to say that he is neither reborn nor not reborn would not fit the case.” Mark Siderits refers to this as “beyond the dichotomy.” What this might mean is that the state of Nirvana is simply indescribable. It may be something that does not follow formal notions of reason and logic. D.T. Suzuki, an author of several books and essays on Zen Buddhism, says: “As long as we stay at the level of relativity or intellectualization, we shall have all kinds of disagreement and have to keep up a series of hot discussions.”

It is fathomable that the state of Nirvana is simply indescribable, but this raises questions about the Buddhist claim that Nirvana is about liberation, a state of bliss, and an end to suffering. How do we know that Nirvana, this indescribable state, is an end to suffering? To this, the Buddhists will uphold the importance of empirical knowledge and trying it out on one’s own. But a problem remains: even though attachment to one’s false sense of self is one of the main causes of suffering, to cease suffering, one must personally experience Nirvana. This renders Nirvana a paradox when looked at from conventional methods of philosophical inquiry. Moreover, even though Nirvana turns out to be a paradoxical concept, the doctrine of the cycle of reincarnation remains, which states that the suffering-laden cycle of birth, death, and rebirth continues as long as there is suffering and as long as one does not attain Nirvana. The question of who it is that undergoes reincarnation still persists. Since conceptually the doctrines of Nirvana and reincarnation are opposites, the paradoxical nature of Nirvana with regard to the doctrine of no-self affects the doctrine of reincarnation and renders it paradoxical as well. Otherwise, omitting just the doctrine of Nirvana could have regained the logical strength of the conceptual framework of Buddhism.

Conclusion

This essay has examined the doctrine of no-self and the doctrines of Nirvana and reincarnation to assess their logical compatibility. Even though the doctrine of no-self, as argued through both the argument from impermanence and the argument from control, appears valid and reasonable, the doctrine of Nirvana turns out to be quite difficult to comprehend on its own. Consequently, the questions raised regarding the compatibility between the doctrines of no-self and Nirvana remain unresolved. Seeing how the doctrines of Nirvana and reincarnation are conceptually opposites, the doctrine of reincarnation also fails to reconcile with the doctrine of no-self.

Since Nirvana is introduced as an indescribable state and verifiable only through strict empirical methods, it becomes challenging to reason how Nirvana could lead to the cessation of suffering. In combination, the two doctrines create a paradox: although the main cause of suffering is the attachment to one’s false sense of self, one must personally experience Nirvana to cease suffering. This leads us to two possible conclusions: (i) at least one of the two doctrines of no-self and Nirvana/reincarnation is false, or (ii) there is a solution to the paradox of Nirvana/reincarnation that is not yet known, or can only be known through strict empirical methods. As far as conventional methods of philosophical inquiry are concerned, the first conclusion seems more plausible.

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